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Aid to Families with Unborn Dependent Children:
May the States Withhold Benefits?
Aid to Families with Dependent Children1 (AFDC) is one of the
categorical public assistance programs established by the Social Security Act of 1935.2 The program has been characterized as a scheme
of "cooperative federalism" 8-a state need not participate in it,4 but
if it does participate, the federal government provides funds pursuant
to a formula delineated in the Social Security Act.5 Under this formula the state must assume a significant portion of the financial
burden of the AFDC program.6 To be eligible for federal funding,
a state must submit an AFDC proposal for approval by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).7 The state retains
responsibility for establishing a mechanism to process applications
and to verify need,8 and each state sets standards of need and the
level of benefits for classes of eligible recipients. 9 Eligibility for
AFDC entitles the recipient to a monthly cash payment,10 rehabilitative services,11 and medical assistance if the state so provides.12
I. The statutory provisions governing the AFDC program are codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-10 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396 (1970). The other categorical public assistance programs are
Old Age Assistance, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1970); Aid to the Blind, see 42 U.S.C. §§
1201-06 (1970); and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, see 42 U.S.C. §§

1351-55 (1970). These three programs have been administered by the federal government since January 1, 1974. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (Supp. II, 1972); 58 CORNELL L.
REv. 803, 803-04 (1973).
3. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 542 (1972): King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316
(1968).
4. All states do have AFDC programs, however. Bennett, Liberty, Equality and
Welfare Reform, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 74, 75-76 (1973). In addition, the definition of
"states," for the purpose of participation in the AFDC program, includes the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. 42 U.S.C. § 130l(a)(l) (1970).
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 603(a)(l)(A)-(B) (1970). Section 603(a)(l) provides that the federal
government will reimburse five sixths of the money a state expends, subject to
limitations on maximum dollar amounts. Also, the federal government assumes 75
per cent of the administrative costs of the program.
6. See note 5 supra.
7, 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. II, 1972). Federal
funds are not made available unless the Secretary approves a state's plan. 42 U.S.C.
§ 603(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972). If there is substantial noncompliance with
any provision required to be included in a plan, the Secretary may approve payments
for aspects of the plan not affected by the noncompliance. 42 U.S.C, § 604(a) (1970),
HEW may promulgate additional requirements for state AFDC programs pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970), See 45 C.F.R. §§ 201-80 (1974).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. II, 1972).
9. King v, Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968).
10. 42 u.s.c. § 601 (1970).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a}(l4)-(15) (1970). The original statute enacted in 1935 did not
include a provision for rehabilitative and other services. The present provisions were
added in 1962. See Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, tit. I, pt. A, §§ 104(a)(4),
(c)(2), 76 Stat. 185.
12, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(IO) (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 248.IO(a)(l), (b)(l)(i) (1974). The
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The AFDC program has been the focus of substantial controversy. Some critics have characterized it as "inadequate and inequi•
table."13 It may force spouses to leave home in order to make their
families eligible for assistance, 14 and a family with an unemployed
wage earner that receives AFDC assistance may be financially better
off than a family that is ineligible because its head holds a low-paying
job.15 Moreover, families in which both parents are present are frequently ineligible for AFDC aid,16 although such families are often
as needy as eligible families. 17 Such cash payments as are made are
often insufficient to meet the recipient's needs.18 Despite these inequities, states have not liberalized eligibility standards, but rather
have attempted to limit eligibility in order to ease fiscal pressures. 10
One such attempt is reflected in the recent plethora of federal
cases concerning the question whether an unborn child is eligible
for assistance under the AFDC program.20 Since AFDC benefits are
original statute enacted in 1935 did not include a provision for medical assistance. The
present provisions are the result of the enactment of the Medicaid program in 1965,
See Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, pt. 2, § 12I(a), 79 Stat. 344. For a
general discussion of the Medicaid program, see Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current Statutory Requirements and Judicial Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV, 7
(May 1974). One who is not eligible for AFDC may still be eligible for aid under state
programs supplemental to AFDC. These programs, often characterized as "general
assistance," "general relief," or "home relief," provide minimal benefits as compared to
AFDC. Because the supplemental programs receive no federal funds, they are not
subject to federal statutory requirements, and the states have absolute control over the
distribution of assistance, subject only to constitutional restraints. See A. LAFRANC!l, M.
SCHROEDER, R. BENNETI &: w. BOYD, I.Aw OF THE POOR 265-66 (1973) [hereinafter LAW
OF THE POOR); Bennett, supra note 4, at 76.

13. See Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 19JS,
59 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 825, 825 (1974). See also H.R. REP, No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess,
96 (1967).
.
14. Detroit Free Press, Dec. 5, 1974, § B, at 1, col. 1 (statement of Representative
Martha Griffiths). See also R. HURLEY, POVERTY AND MENTAL RETARDATION: A CAUSAL
RELATIONSHIP 165-66 (1969); Bennett, supra note 4, at 77; N.Y. Times, Oct, 27, 1974, § I,
at 33, col. I (late city ed.).
15. Detroit Free Press, Dec. 5, 1974, § B, at I, col, 6,
16. The Social Security Act permits states to expand the causes of deprivation of
parental support or care to include unemployment of the child's father under des•
ignated conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970). In states adopting this option, a family can
be eligible for AFDC benefits although both mother and father are healthy and living
together, if the father is unemployed within the meaning of the statute, In about
half of the states, however, eligibility for AFDC requires the absence of a parent, LAW
OF THE POOR, supra note 12, at 262·63; Bennett, supra note 4, at 76,
17. Detroit Free Press, Dec. 5, 1974, § B, at 1, col. 1. It has been estimated that
welfare programs aid only one fourth of those who are poor. R. HURLEY, supra note
14, at 165-66 (statement of Senator Robert F. Kennedy).
18. Detroit Free Press, Dec. 5, 1974, § B, at 1, col. 3; R. HURLEY, supra note 14, at
171; Hearings on Nutrition and Human Needs Before the Senate Select Comm, on
Nutrition and Human Needs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess, 614-15 (1969) [hereinafter Nutrition

Hearings],
19. Bennett, supra note 4, at 78.
20. _Five federal courts of appeals and till'elve district courts have held that the un•
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available only to families that have a "dependent child," the resolution of this question hinges upon the interpretation of section
406(a) of the Social Security Act,21 which defines the term "dependent child." That section does not make explicit reference to the
eligibility of unborn children under the AFDC program, nor does
any other section of the Act. A regulation promulgated by the
Health, Education, and Welfare Department does permit states to
aid the unborn child and to receive federal funds for so doing, but
born child is entitled to AFDC benefits: Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974),
a/fg. 363 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Miss. 1973); Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir.
1974), a/fg. 369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.SL.W. 3218
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1974) (No. 74-242); Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), ajfg.
358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973), and Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind.
1973); Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), afjg. 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa
1973), reud., 43 U.SL.W. 4374 (U.S. March 18, 1975) [see Postscript-Ed.]; Doe v. Lukhard,
493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), afjg. 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. May 24, 1974) (No. 73-1763); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F.
Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1973); Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Jones
v. Graham, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 11 18,070 (D. Neb. 1973);
Wisdom v. Norton, 372 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Conn.), reud., 507 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1974);
Morris v. Houston, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 11 19,945 (:,'v .D. Mich., Oct. 18, 1974); Welling
v. Westby, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 11 19,252 (D.S.D., Jan. 17, 1974). Two district courts
have granted preliminary injunctions against state denials of AFDC benefits to unborn
children. Tapia v. Vowell, Civ. No. 73-B-169 (S.D. Tex., Nov. 4, 1973); Tillman v.
Endsley, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 1117,858 (S.D. Fla. 1973). One
court of appeals and four federal district courts have held that states are not compelled to give AFDC benefits to unborn children: Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1974); Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
880 (1974); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974); Parks v. Harden, 354
F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973), reud., 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974); Murrow v. Clifford,
Civ. No. 114-73 (D.N.J., June 12, 1973), vacated, 502 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1974). Two
state courts have dealt peripherally with the eligibility of the unborn child for AFDC
benefits. California Welfare Rights Organization v. Brian, 11 Cal. 3d 237, 520 P.2d
970, 113 Cal. Rptr. 154, application for stay denied, 419 U.S. 959 (1974), examined
whether the unborn child was entitled to be treated as a "person" for the purpose of
computing the amount of AFDC aid the child would receive pursuant to California
legislation. Fletcher v. Lavine, 75 Misc. 2d 808, 349 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.
1973), examined whether the local social service department's policy of denying benefits to households of pregnant women who were not recipients of public assistance
was permissible. Boincs v. Lavine, 71 Misc. 2d 259, 335 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct., Monroe
Co. 1972), examined the policy of not activating a case when the mother of an unborn
child is not on AFDC. One state attorney general has issued an opinion denying
AFDC benefits to unborn children. [1969-1970] S.D. Arrv. GEN. BIENNIAL REP. No.
69-77, pt. 219 (Aug. 28, 1969).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a} (1970):
When used in this part(a) The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has been deprived
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the
home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his
father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother,
stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of
residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home,
and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one
and ••• a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly
attending a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for
gainful employment.
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the agency considers such aid to be at the option of states participating in the AFDC program.22
This note will examine whether the duty to provide aid to unborn children should be imposed on all states participating in the
AFDC program. It will first consider the argument that denying such
benefits violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, but the bulk of the note will be devoted to an interpretation
of the relevant provisions of the Social Security Act. The statutory
analysis requires several steps. First, it is necessary to examine and
interpret the cases in which the Supreme Court has analyzed the
legitimacy of state-imposed eligibility conditions. The focus will then
shift to the proper reading of the term "dependent children." The
HEW regulation dealing with aid to the unborn child and the
stated purposes of the Social Security Act are discussed in this context.
Pregnant mothers have alleged that the denial of AFDC benefits
to unborn children contravenes the equal protection clause, resting
their claim upon the state's failure to grant AFDC aid to them and
their unborn children while it grants such aid to born children
and their families. Although the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 28
raised a major barrier to one aspect of this claim by holding that an
unborn child is not a "person" for the purpose of asserting rights
under the equal protection clause,24 that decision did not foreclose
the rights of pregnant women. Thus, the court in Carver v. Hooker21l
allowed pregnant mothers as a class to pursue an equal protection
claim,26 basing its holding on the perceived harm to the pregnant
mothers' health if AFDC benefits were denied them. 27 In Alcala v.
Burns, 28 the court reached the same result by recognizing that "[t]he
payments are made to the family and not the unborn child."29
Having been given the right to assert a claim, the pregnant
mother must show that the classification granting AFDC aid only
22. The HEW regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii) (1974), provides that federal
financial participation is available for "[p]ayments [made] with. respect to an unborn
child when the fact of pregnancy has been determined by medical diagnosis." As of
1973, 19 states provided aid to the unborn. Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga,
1973), revd., 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974).
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. 410 U.S. at 156-59.
25. 369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974).
26. 369 F. Supp. at 210.
27. The court noted that "[i]f a pregnant woman does not ingest enough protein
during the gestation period, then the developing fetus will satisfy its needs from the
permanent protein stores of the mother's body; and this process can result in the
physical deterioration of her muscles and bodily tissues." 869 F. Supp. at 210.
28. 862 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973), afld., 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), revd,; 43
U.S.L.W. 4374 (U.S. March 18, 1975) (See Postscript-Ed.).
29. 862 F. Supp. at 186.
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to born, needy children cannot be justified. Several justifications for
the discrimination have been offered by states.30
First, it has been asserted that the limitation on aid discourages
illegitimate births by placing the entire cost of an extramarital
pregnancy on the unmarried woman. 31 This justification, which is
of course based on a moral judgment, may no longer be viable in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in King v. Smith.32 The Court
there emphasized that a state should not attempt to regulate such
matters as immorality and illegitimacy by placing conditions on
eligibility for assistance.33 Although King involved an issue of
statutory construction, rather than a constitutional claim, the unacceptability of a rationale of discouraging illegitimacy as support
for an interpretation of a statute may well be determinative of the
acceptability of such a justification in a constitutional case as well.
There is no reason why a state purpose that a court finds invalid and
therefore unable to support a particular statutory interpretation
should become valid as a justification for upholding a clearly worded
statute in an equal protection case.
30. It is not clear what degree of scrutiny a court must apply to each justification.
The court has employed tlvo alternative standards in equal protection cases, depend.
ing on the particular classification being challenged. The court subjects statutes in•
valving fundamental interests, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), or
suspect classifications, e.g., Grabam v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), to strict scrutiny, while it accords minimal scrutiny to
other statutes. E.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). (The Court in Dandridge rejected the contention that the right
to sustenance is fundamental. For critical commentary, see Dienes, To Feed the
Hungry: Judidal Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 555
(1973).) Under minim.al scrutiny, a court will sustain a classification if it is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 486-87 (1970): "The Equal Protection Clause does not require that a state must
choose betlveen attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem
at all • • • • It is enough that the State's action be rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination." A court using such a standard might easily conclude that
AFDC assistance to the needy unborn child is not required by the equal protection
clause. If strict scrutiny were to be utilized, however, none of the asserted justifications for denying aid, see text at notes 31-38 infra, could sustain the classification.
An intermediate standard of review has been used on occasion-its implications for
aid to the unborn are unclear. See United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REv. 55, 125,-33
(1973). See also Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A. Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1970). For a general discussion of equal protection analysis, see
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
31. Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 215 (D.N.H. 1973), afjd., 501 F.2d 1244
(1st Cir. 1974).
32. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
33. 392 U.S. at 321-27. See also 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (Supp. II, 1972); 107 CONG. REc.
3766 (1961) (statement of Representative Ho!Iman).
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A second justification, limiting the welfare rolls,34 also appears
questionable in light of Supreme Court decisions that have consistently held that the goal of lower welfare costs must be achieved
by means other than limiting the eligibility of individuals for public assistance.35
The third justification given for denying AFDC benefits to pregnant women focuses on the usefulness of such a limitation in combating fraud. The fear is that a woman might continue to request
and receive aid after her pregnancy had been terminated by an abortion.36 Caseworkers, however, should find it easy to investigate alleged attempts at fraud-for a start they need only inquire whether
a pregnant woman who claimed benefits throughout her term in fact
gave birth, or they could require periodic verification by a physician. Even if some abuse goes undetected, there is no reason to suspect that the amount of fraud would justify abandoning the program
or even that it would exceed the level of welfare fraud generally.
The final claimed justification for denying aid to pregnant
women rests on the limited objectives of the AFDC program: maintaining and strengthening the family unit and aiding needy children.
Until the child is born, it is argued, the concern that a parent be
in the home to raise the child does not come into play. Aid to unborn
children thus is not necessary.37 However, there is strong evidence
that proper prenatal care and nutrition are essential both for the
child's post-partum development and for the general welfare of the
family. 38 Granting benefits to pregnant women thus would seem to
further the objectives of the AFDC program.
In sum, none of the justifications that have been offered for
denying AFDC benefits to pregnant women are convincing. Whether
they are so weak as to compel a holding that states must provide such
benefits, however, is unclear. Much depends on the level of scrutiny
that should be applied in passing on the question, an issue that apparently has not yet been resolved. 89
34. See Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (N.D, Fla. 1974); Carver v.
Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 215 (D.N.H. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir, 1974),
35. E.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 (1972): Shapiro v, Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 633 (1968): King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968). The state's interest
in fiscal management can be achieved by the less onerous means of raising the
standard of need and lowering the level of benefits.
36. See Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798, 804 (D. Mass. 1973).
37. Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1974).
38. See notes 129-37 infra and accompanying text.
39. Even if the equal protection argument does not prevail on its merits, it nonetheless serves as the basis for subject-matter jurisdiction in the federal courts over
suits asserting statutory entitlement to AFDC benefits. Subject-matter jurisdiction in
such cases is grounded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), giving a cause of action, inter alia,
to any person deprived of constitutional rights under color of state law, and 28 U.S.C,
§ 1343(3) (1970), providing for federal jurisdiction over suits brought "[t]o redress
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In any case, the equal protection issue need not be decided if
the Social Security Act itself extends benefits to unborn children,
and many lower courts have avoided the constitutional question by
so holding. The decisions are far from unanimous, however. The
majority of courts have held that inasmuch as the Social Security
Act does not explicitly exclude unborn children, states participating
in the program must provide them with AFDC benefits.4°Conversely,
a minority of courts have reasoned that since the Act does not explicitly include unborn children, the state need not grant them
AFDC benefits.41 The split in authority thus centers on the extent
of a state's discretion to withhold benefits from individuals whose
eligibility for aid is unclear on the face of the Social Security Act.
Aspects of this issue have been considered by the Supreme Court
in King v. Smith,42 Townsend v. Swank,43 Carleson v. Remillard,44
and New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino. 45
King was the Court's first pronouncement on statutory entitlement to AFDC benefits. Alabama promulgated a "substitute father"
regulation that denied AFDC benefits to a family whenever the
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States • . • ." The equal protection claim is necessary because the Supreme Court has not yet held that section
1343(3) can be utilized when a conflict with the Social Security Act is the only asserted
basis for relief. See, e.g., Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Stogner
v. Page, I CCH Pov. L. REP. ,i 553.901 (N.D. III. 1970). The assertion of the constitutional claim, whicl1 clearly does come under section 1343(3), allows the federal court
to adjudicate the statutory claim under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. See
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974); UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1968).
Under Hagans, the constitutional claim must be neither "wholly insubstantial" nor
"obviously frivolous." 415 U.S. at 536-37. The equal protection claim of plaintiff
mothers in the federal cases concerned with the eligibility of the unborn cllild for
AFDC benefits clearly would meet this standard.
Since it is an accepted_ judicial procedure to rule. on a. ~tatutory claim before
reaclling a constitutional argument, see, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291
(1971); Siler v. Louisville &: Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1908), a single
federal judge, rather than a three-judge panel convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281
(1970), will first consider the case. Only if the single judge rules against the plaintiffs
on the statutory issue will a three-judge panel be convened to consider the constitutional claim. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). See, e.g., Murrow v. Clifford, 502
F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1974).
Jurisdiction over the statutory claim might also be based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970), provided that the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. It could be argued
that the denial of AFDC benefits to the unborn cllild threatens immediate and personal damage to life and health that is likely to exceed $10,000. See Marquez v.
Hardin, 339 F. Supp. 1364, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See
See
392
404
406
413

cases cited note 20 supra.
cases cited note 20 supra.
U.S. 309 (1968).
U.S. 282 (1971).
U.S. 598 (1972).
U.S. 405 (1973).
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mother "cohabitated" with any able-bodied male. 46 The plaintiff in
King challenged this regulation as conflicting with the terms of the
Act; 47 Alabama responded that the states have the right to define
the term "parent" in section 4O6(a) of the Act as including a "substitute father.''48
While recognizing that the states have considerable latitude in
determining the level of benefits they grant to eligible classes,40 the
Court found that section 4O2(a)(IO) of the Act60 imposed a duty on
the states to furnish aid to all eligible individuals, and that Alabama
had breached that duty. 61 Since the legislative history of the Act
indicated a congressional purpose "to provide programs for the economic security and protection of all children ... ,"li2 the Court held
that the term "parent" in section 4O6(a) included only those persons
with a legal duty to support a particular child. Because the "substitute fathers" in the Alabama regulation had no legal duty of
support, the children involved were "dependent children" within the
meaning of the Act and had to be provided aid. GB
The King opinion did not reveal whether the approach the Court
took there would govern other questions of eligibility under the
Social Security Act. The Court's subsequent decision in Townsend v.
Swank,5 4 however, appeared to indicate that it would. Townsend involved a challenge to Illinois' policy of denying eligibility for AFDC
to individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one enrolled
in colleges or universities.55 The broader question was whether states
could limit the eligibility of an individual who fell within the definition of "dependent child" in section 4O6(a) of the Act.'i 6 Illinois
argued that its exclusion of college students helped needy children
to become employable and self-sufficient and ensured the fiscal integrity of the Illinois welfare program. 57
The Supreme Court held that, if individuals are eligible under
46. Alabama used "cohabitation" as a euphemism for "frequent" or "continuing
sexual relations," and did not require that the substitute father actually reside in the
home or be the father of the children. 392 U.S. at 314.
47. 392 U.S. at 329-33.
48. 392 U.S. at 327. The issue of a child's eligibility turned on the interpretation
of the term "parent" because section 406(a) in part defines dependent children as
those "deprived of parental support." 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
49. 392 U.S. at 318-19.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(l0) (Supp. II, 1972).
51. 392 U.S. at 333.
52. 392 U.S. at 330 (emphasis original).
53. 392 U.S. at 333,
54. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
55. 404 U.S. at 283-85.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970),
57. 404 U.S. at 291.
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federal standards, a state may not exclude them from the AFDC
program without clear evidence of congressional authorization or
intent to allow the States to do so.58 Since the Act did not specifically
exclude individuals aged eighteen to twenty-one and attending college from eligibility, Illinois' exclusion of that group was invalid
under the King approach: "King v. Smith establishes that, at least in
the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly
evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a
state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance
under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and
is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause." 59 Although the
Court noted that legislative history supported its interpretation that
children aged eighteen to 1'venty-one and attending college were
covered by the Act,60 it is not clear whether this finding was essential
to the Court's holding because it read King to require that states
grant aid to all individuals apparently eligible on the face of the Act,
absent explicit congressional authorization of their exclusion.
This broad interpretation of King was reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Carleson v. Remillard,61 in which no legislative history
spoke to the issue of eligibility involved-California's interpretation
of the term "continued absence" of a parent, one of the criteria for
eligibility under the Act, as not including absence due to military
service.62 The Court examined the Social Security Act and its legislative history and found no congressional intent to deny eligibility in
cases in which a parent is absent on military service.63 The Court
relied on Townsend and King in holding that eligibility was to be
measured by the federal standard; that is, individuals not excluded
by the Act must be given aid unless states are specifically allowed to
change the requirements for eligibility.64 Since the Court found no
58. 404 U.S. at 286.
59. 404 U.S. at 286. The supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides:
"This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."
60. 404 U.S. at 287-91.
61. 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
62. 406 U.S. at 599.
63. 406 U.S. at 603.04. The Court stated:
We cannot assume here anymore than we could in King v. Smith, • • • that
while Congress "intended to provide programs for the economic security and
protection of all children,'' it also "intended arbitrarily to leave one class of
destitute children entirely without meaningful protection." •• • • We are especially confident Congress could not have designed an Act leaving uncared for an
entire class who became "needy children" because their fathers were in the Armed
Services defending their country.
406 U.S. at 604 (emphasis original), quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 330 (1968).
64. 406 U.S. at 604.
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evidence indicating a congressional intent to extend eligibility to the
plaintiffs, Garleson broadened the King and Townsend holdings
somewhat, in effect creating a presumption of eligibility. So long as
an individual is arguably covered by the Act, his eligibility should
be protected from state limitations by the King-Townsend-Carleson
clear exclusion rule.
The consistency the Supreme Court showed in King, Townsend,
and Garleson was apparently ended in New York State Department
of Social Services v. Dublino,06 which casts some doubt on whether
the King-Townsend-Carleson approach will be applied to eligibility
requirements unrelated to need. In Dublino, the Court dealt with
whether a state permissibly denied public assistance to an eligible
recipient who refused to participate in a state work program sup•
plemental to the federal Work Incentive Program (WIN).00 The
majority opinion focused on whether WIN preempted the supplemental state work program, and concluded that it did not. 07 The
Court did not find an express congressional intent to allow states
to require participation in local work programs, but it inferred such
an intent from the limited operation of WIN and the omission of
express preemptive language in the Social Security Act. 08 The Court
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether particular sections of the state supplemental work program at issue conflicted with the provisions of WIN. 6° Citing King, Townsend, and
Carleson, the Court noted that if there was a substantial conflict between the federal provisions and the state program, the federal law
would control for the purpose of establishing eligibility.70
Although Dublino did not explicitly overrule King, Townsend,
and Carleson, it may well have limited their application. Dublino
departed from the earlier cases by upholding state conditions on
eligibility that were not explicitly authorized by the Act. Moreover,
the Court suggested that the earlier decisions dealt with situations
in which the Social Security Act expressly granted eligibility to the
plaintiffs,71 although those opinions rested on the fact that the Act
had not expressly denied eligibility. 72 In his dissent in Dublino,
Justice Marshall noted that the majority opinion ignored the thrust
of King, Townsend, and Carleson, and emphasized the need for a
clear statement of legislative intent before a variation from federal
65. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(l9), 637, 640 (1970), 607(b), 670(c), 630-36, 638-39, 641-44
(Supp. II, 1972).
67. 413 U.S. at 422.
68. 413 U.S. at 414-17.
69. 413 U.S. at 422-23.
70. 413 U.S. at 423 n.29.
71. 413 U.S. at 421-22.
72. See text at notes 46-61 supra,
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requirements of eligibility for AFDC benefits would be permitted.73
Dublino perhaps should not be read as changing the basic thesis
of King, Townsend, and Carleson that state deviations from federal
eligibility standards can be tolerated only if expressly allowed by the
language and legislative history of the Social Security Act. Nevertheless, the cases do seem to present conflicting theories as to the proper
construction of the Act. Dublino reads the Act as delineating the
outer limits of federal participation, within which states may further
restrict eligibility; King, Townsend, and Carleson interpret the Act
to mandate state aid to individuals eligible under federal standards
if the state elects to participate in the AFDC program. Federal courts
dealing with the question of AFDC aid to the unborn have recognized this tension and have reached varied results.74
·
It may be possible, however, to reconcile the four cases. In the
first place, King, Townsend, and Carleson revolved around section
406(a) of the Act,75 which sets out the qualifications an individual
must have to be eligible for assistance. On the other hand, Dublino
concerned section 402(a)(l9),76 one of the twenty-three different requirements listed in section 402(a) that a state program must meet
in order to receive federal funding. Thus, the rule of construction
developed in King, Townsend, and Carleson may be limited to questions concerning the type of individual eligible for aid under the
Act; in other words, those persons arguably eligible under federal
standards must be assisted unless they fall under a state exclusion
that Congress has specifically authorized. The Dublino rule may be
restricted to analyses of the validity of state procedural conditions
for assistance: Such limitations will be permitted so long as they are
not clearly disapproved of in the Act.
The dichotomy developed above seems to be consistent with the
policies of the Social Security Act. Granting the states wide leeway
in the administration of their AFDC programs-one aspect of the
Dublino holding-accords with the idea that the AFDC program is
a joint federal-state effort that allows for significant state autonomy.
The Act specifically gives the states a great degree of flexibility in
determining the amount of benefits to be given an eligible recipi•
73. 413 U.S. at 432.
74. See, e.g., Doe v. Luk.hard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd., 493 F.2d 54
(4th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. May 28, 1974) (No.
73-1763); Alcala v. Bums, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), revd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4374 (U.S.
March 18, 1975) [See Postscript-Ed.]; Wilson v. Weaver, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974)
{utilizing the traditional interpretation of King, Townsend, and Carleson to hold
that the unborn child is entitled to AFDC benefits); Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1974); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (utilizing the
Dublino standard and concluding that assistance is not required).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) (Supp. II, 1972).

572

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 73:!i61

ent.77 Moreover, wide latitude with respect to state procedural conditions on eligibility is implicit in the Act. For example, states may
demand verification of an individual's need for assistance,78 although
the Act itself does not so provide. Similarly, states must create their
own applications processes; 70 the Act is silent on the subject. Finally,
although the Act gives the states no explicit mandate to require recipients to submit to home visits by caseworkers as a condition for
aid, the Supreme Court validated such a requirement in Wyman v.
]ames. 80 In that case New York had permitted assistance to be terminated if the recipient refused to consent to a home visit by a caseworker.81 The Court refused to accept the argument that a home
visit was a "search" within the fourth amendment,82 and allowed the
condition to stand. There was no inquiry whether the federal
statute permitted a home visit as a condition of eligibility; the Court
simply cited a few provisions of the Social Security Act to demonstrate that the visits served a purpose that was consistent with the
goals of the AFDC program. 83 Wyman is consistent with Dublino
in that it upheld a procedural condition on eligibility that was not
specifically provided for in the Act.
Strong policy reasons mitigate in favor of restricting Dublino
to the procedural area, however, and against extending it to substantive questions of eligibility. First, equitable considerations argue for
mandatory federal eligibility standards. Compliance ·with state procedural conditions permissible under Dublino and under section
402(a) is a matter of choice. Administrative requirements do not
drastically alter the basic reach of the AFDC program. On the other
hand, substantive state eligibility prerequisites affect families on the
basis of characteristics they are relatively powerless to change, such
as the age of the dependent child and the absence of a parent. Significant state latitude in articulating new requirements will therefore
lead to great variations among the states as to the classes of persons
eligible to receive benefits.
Apart from the possible inequity of such a situation, the increasing federal financial and regulatory contributions to the AFDC
program warrant less state discretion in fixing eligibility require77. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968).
78. See, e.g., Comment, Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance: Selected
Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1307, 1308,
1316-19 (1967); MICH. DEFT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES, .As.5ISTANCE PAYMENTS MANUAL, Item
201, at 12-15 (March 1, 1974) [hereinafter PAYJ\ffiNTS MANUAL].
79. See LAW OF THE PooR, supra note 12, at 297; Comment, supra note 78, at 1313,
See, e.g., PAYJ\ffiNTS MANUAL, supra note 78, Item 201, at 3-21.
80. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
81. 400 U.S. at 310.
82. 400 U.S. at 317,
83. 400 U.S. at 315.
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ments than the Dublino rule would allow. The relative share and
absolute level of federal AFDC funding have risen consistently since
1935.84 Moreover, statutory provisions increasing federal supervision
have proliferated since the enactment of the program. 85 AFDC has
evolved from a program with a strong state orientation to one deeply
tinted with a federal bias. Mandatory federal guidelines for deciding
the type of individual to receive aid is in keeping with this trend.
There is also a benefit to be gained from explicit criteria for interpreting the Social Security Act. In his dissent in Dublino, Justice
Marshall noted that "[t]he policy of clear statement in Townsend
serves a useful purpose. It informs legislators that, if they wish to
alter the accommodations previously arrived at in an Act of major
importance, they must indicate clearly that wish, since what may
appear to be minor changes of narrow scope may in fact have ramifications throughout the administration of the Act."86 The requirement under King, Townsend, and Carleson of explicit authority for
state alteration of eligibility requirements gives Congress notice of
how its amendments to the Social Security Act ·will be read and
stimulates it to give careful consideration to whether it desires state
flexibility in setting eligibility requirements.
It might also be noted that if a Dublino presumption allowing
state restrictions on all criteria for eligibility were to govern, a state
might be able to implement limitations that contravene the purposes
of the AFDC program as set out in section 40 I of the Social Security
Act.87 Thus, a state could exclude ten-year-old children from assistance because there is no specific mandate in the Act to aid them.
This exclusion would be contrary to the intent of Congress to aid
needy dependent children, and Dublino should not be read to allow it.
Inasmuch as the right of the unborn child to AFDC benefits involves a question of the eligibility of individuals under section
406(a),88 rather than a procedural limitation conditioning the receipt
of welfare benefits pursuant to section 402,89 the King-TownsendCarleson standard of interpretation of the Social Security Act is applicable. Unborn children are thus entitled to AFDC benefits if
84. See, e.g., 1972 U.S. CODE CoNG. SERV. 4990, 4992; 1956 U.S. CoDE CONG. SERv.
3940; H.R. REP. No. 544, supra note 13, at 110. For the current formula for federal
contribution, see 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1970); note 5 supra.
85. Compare Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, § 402(a), 49 Stat. 627, with 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
86. 413 U.S. at 431. Adherence to the King rule would mean that any congressional
expansion of eligibility under the AFDC program would be mandatory on the states,
unless Congress specifically indicated that it wished the expansion to be optional.
87. 42 u.s.c. § 601 (1970).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (Supp. II, 1972).
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they are arguably eligible for aid under federal eligibility standards,
state exclusions notwithstanding. A discussion of their status under
federal law occupies the balance of this note.
Beginning with a literal analysis of the statute, eligibility is conferred on needy dependent children who are deprived of the care
and support of a parent and who are under the age of eighteen.00
Some lower courts have relied on the dictionary definition of the
word "child," which includes fetuses, 01 in granting benefits to unborn
children.02 Another court allowed unborn children to be excluded
on the basis of the medical definition of the word "child." 08 Still
other courts have found the term "dependent child" ambiguous. 04
Perhaps the most that can be said with any assurance is that the
term can be construed to include the unborn, and, more importantly,
it does not clearly exclude them.
The legislative history of the Social Security Act and its amendments is similarly ambiguous. In 1972, Congress considered but did
not pass a provision excluding the unborn child from the AFDC
program.05 Different courts have drawn different conclusions from
this congressional deliberation; 96 its ambiguity is highlighted by indications that "the reason the legislation was not passed was because
the Congress decided to deal only with the Adult Categories of Public Assistance .... " 07 Again, the most that can be said is that in 1972
Congress was aware that federal funds were being used by some
states to aid unborn children under the AFDC program.
Some courts have discerned a congressional purpose to aid the
unborn from the provision for maternity and health care in the Child
Health Act. 98 This legislation does evidence a concern for the ade90. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
91. Among the definitions of the word "child" in Webster's Third New Interna•
tional Dictionary is "an unborn • • • human being."
92. Wisdom v. Norton, 372 F. Supp. ll90, ll92 (D. Conn.), revd., 507 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1974); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798, 802 (D. Mass. 1973); Harris v.
Mississippi State Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 363 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (N.D. Miss. 1973),
affd. sub nom. Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Weaver, 358
F. Supp. ll47, ll54 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affd., 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974).
93. Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 54 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
94. Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1974); Carver v. Hooker, 369
F. Supp. 204, 212 (D.N.H. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974) (No. 74-242).
95. See H.R. REP. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 184 (1972); S. REP. No. 92-1230,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1972).
96. Compare Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147, ll54-55 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affd.,
499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974), and Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798, 803 (D. Mass.
1973), with Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 55 (M.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880
(1974).
97. Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 55 (M.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974).
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-05 (1970). E.g., Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 212-15
(D.N.H. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d 1244 (1st Cir. 1974); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp.
798, 802-03 (D. Mass. 1973).
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quacy of prenatal care, but the argument fails because of the legislative chronology: Unborn children have been granted AFDC benefits since 1946,99 while the program for maternity and infant care
was not enacted until 1963.100 The only safe conclusion is that the
Child Health Act provides no evidence that there was ever an intent
to exclude the unborn child from the AFDC program.
In light of the ambiguity of the statute and its legislative history, reference must be made to other factors. One such factor is the
administrative interpretation of the HEW.101 HEW regulations permit states to aid unborn children,102 thereby impliedly including that
group within the basic eligible group of "dependent children." Aid
is not mandatory, however; matching federal funds are available to
states participating in the AFDC program whether or not their plans
include unborn children.103
The proper deference to be accorded the HEW regulation is
integral to the analysis of the unborn child's eligibility. If the regulation is deemed conclusive, then federal law itself allows states to exclude unborn children, and the King-Townsend-Carleson line of
cases is inapplicable. If the regulation is totally disregarded, the
eligibility of the unborn child for assistance remains ambiguous under federal law. Finally, one might defer to the regulation in so far
as it includes the unborn child within the term "dependent child,"
but disregard it to the extent that it allows the states to refuse to aid
unborn children.104
99. See DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC AssisTANCE ADMINISTRATION § 3412.6 (Nov. 4, 1946). The HEW administrative practice regarding the unborn developed out of an audit policy in 1941 regarding Wisconsin's
AFDC program, which provided aid to the unborn child, and later evolved into a
regulation. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(2)(ii) (1974). See note 22 supra.
100. Act of Oct. 24, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-156, 77 Stat. 273. Courts have argued
that the language and purpose of the Child Health Act indicate an intent to provide
maternity aid in those provisions rather than under the AFDC program. See Wisdom
v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 755 n.27 (2d Cir. 1974); Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 54
(M.D. Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974). However, there is no indication in statutory language or legislative history that the Child Health Act provision for prenatal
care was to be the only means by which such care was to be encouraged. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 703 (1970); S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 191-99 (1967); (H.R. REP. No. 544,
supra note 13, at 124-30.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) provides: "The Secretary ••• shall make and publish
such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the Act as may be necessary to the
efficient administration with which the Secretary is charged."
102. See note 22 supra.
103. The HEW contends that aid to the unborn child is optional because the
definition of "dependent child" in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970) is not binding on the states.
See Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
104. See Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743, 746 (8th Cir. 1974), revd., 43 U.S.L.W. 4374
(U.S. March 18, 1975) [See Postscript-Ed.]; Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823,
829 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd., 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43
U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. May 24, 1974) (No. 73-1763); Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp.
1147, 1153 (N.D. III. 1973), affd., 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974).
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The Court has not followed a consistent approach toward interpreting HEW regulations in the welfare context. As a general
rule, deference is traditionally given to the regulations of an administrative agency granted rulemaking authority to interpret an
organic statute.105 The Supreme Court explicitly applied this rule
of statutory construction in Lewis v. Martin, 106 holding that California could not consider a dependent child's resources to include any
income of a man assuming the role of a spouse, absent a showing of
actual financial contribution, because there would othenvise be a
conflict with an HEW regulation.107
Where an HEW regulation has conflicted with statutory eligibility requirements, however, it has been ignored. Thus, in Townsend
v. Swank108 the Court disregarded an HEW regulation that impliedly
permitted states to alter their eligibility requirements from federal
standards.109 The Court stated: "[T]he principle that accords substantial weight to interpretation of a statute by the department entrusted with its administration is inapplicable insofar as those
regulations are inconsistent with the requirements of § 402(a)(I0)
that aid be furnished 'to all eligible individuals.' "110 In Carleson v.
Remillard111 the Court dealt with an HEW regulation that approved state plans permitting the payment of federal AFDC funds
to families in which the absence of a parent was due to military
service. The regulation also approved state plans under which such
families were not given assistance.112 The Court was influenced by
the regulation to the extent that the HEW defined "continued
absence" to include military absence. Based upon its decisions in
King and Townsend, however, the Court rejected the validity of the
regulation to the extent that it allowed states to withdraw the benefits at issue: "We search the Act in vain ... for any authority to
make 'continued absence' into an accordion-like concept, applicable
to some parents because of 'continued absence' but not to others." 118
The Court's approach in Carleson is appropriate for the analysis of the unborn child's eligibility for public assistance benefits. Inasmuch as the HEW asserts that an unborn child is eligible under
the Act as a "dependent child," its direction that states may disre105. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United
States, 307 U.S. 125, 146 (1939).
106. 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
107. 397 U.S. at 559-60.
108. 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971).
109. 45 C.F.R. § 233.lO(a)(l)(ii) (1973). For a general discussion, see Note, Welfare's
"Condition X", 76 YALE L.J. 1222 (1967).
110. 404 U.S. at 286 (emphasis original).
lll. 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
112. 406 U.S. at 602.
113. 406 U.S. at 602.
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gard the federal eligibility standard is invalid under King, Townsend, and Carleson.114 On the other hand, it would· be inconsistent
for the HEW to assert that the unborn are not eligible as "dependent
children" and yet allow federal funds to be disbursed to state programs aiding the unborn, because section 403 allows funds to be
extended only to eligible individuals.115 It is thus logical to infer
that the unborn child is a "dependent child" within section 406(a)
of the Act116 on the basis of the HEW regulation. States must therefore provide aid to the unborn under King, Townsend, and Carleson.
Another factor that might bear on the analysis of whether the
unborn child falls within the term "dependent child" is the status
of the unborn in other areas of the law. In Roe v. Wade 117 the Supreme Court considered the status of an unborn child in the context
of examining the constitutionality of legislation forbidding most
abortions. Grounding its analysis on the individual's constitutional
right to privacy,118 the Court upheld the right of a pregnant woman
to obtain an abortion. Although it rejected the state's asserted interest in the protection of the fetus because the word "person" as
used in the fourteenth amendment119 did not encompass the unborn
child,12° the Court found the state's interest in the protection of the
fetus "compelling" at the point of viability.121 Neither the exclusion
of the unborn child from the protection of the fourteenth amendment nor the Coun's conclusion that the state's interest in regulating
abortions does not begin until viability precludes Congress from enacting legislation designed to aid the unborn child. Indeed, it might
be argued that permitting a pregnant mother to receive AFDC assistance furthers the constitutional right to privacy developed in
Wade. The Court in Wade concluded that that right was "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy."122 The state abortion statute at issue was invalid be114. See text at notes 46-64 supra.
115. 42 u.s.c. § 603 (1970).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
117. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For critical analyses of Roe, see Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Comment, Roe v. Wade
and the Traditional Legal Standards Concerning Pregnancy, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 715 (1974).
118. 410 U.S. at 155. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (companion case).
119, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I, provides in part: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall ••• deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
120, 410 U.S. at 157-58,
121. 410 U.S. at 164-65. Once the fetus is viable, "the State in promoting its interest
in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe abortion ••••" 410 U.S. at 164-65. "Viability" was not specifically defined, but the Court
noted that it included fetuses "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb,
albeit with artificial aid." 410 U.S. at 160.
122. 410 U.S. at 157.
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cause it denied the pregnant woman the right to make that choice.
If the needy pregnant mother cannot obtain assistance prior to giving birth, her choice whether to have the child is likewise impeded.
It is not inconceivable that the inability of an impoverished woman
to meet the costs of adequate prenatal medical care and nutrition
would drive her to seek an abortion. The provision of AFDC
aid to unborn children thus has the potential for promoting the
freedom of personal choice that assumed importance in Wade.
Although the law has recognized the interests of unborn children
in other areas,123 it has taken no consistent approach. A number of
jurisdictions have recognized a right of recovery for the wrongful
death of a stillborn child because of prenatal injuries. 124 The unborn child has been recognized as a person for the purpose of acquiring property rights, and is permitted to be represented by
guardians ad litem.125 The diversity of the law with respect to the
unborn, however, suggests that each question concerning the legal
status of the unborn child must be answered separately. It therefore
is necessary to inquire whether substantial policy reasons mandate
that the unborn child be included within the term "dependent
child" in section 40 I of the Social Security Act.
Section 40 I states that the goal of the AFDC program is to encourage the care of needy dependent children by maintaining and
strengthening the family unit.126 The extent to which the unborn
child needs aid was conceded even in Parks v. Harden,12 1 a case that
held in the district court against mandatory aid to the unborn child:
"There can be no question that, in terms of need and dependency,
many unborn children are in far more severe circumstances than
born children, who, at least, have the possibility of an active mother
capable of assisting in their care and support."12s
123. See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsis•
tencies, 46 NoTRE DAME I.Aw. 349 (1971); Comment, Negligence and the Unborn Child:
A Time for Change, IS S.D. L. REv. 204 (1973).
124. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 338 (4th ed. 1971); Note, supra
note 123, at 354-60; Comment, supra note 123, at 215-19. The majority rule denies
recovery, however. w. PROSSER, supra, at 335-38; 2 F. HARPER 8: F. JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS 1028-31 (1956).
125. Note, supra note 123, at 351-54; Comment, supra note 123, at 214.
126. Section 401, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970), provides:
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own
homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial
assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives
with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to
help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum
self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection, there is authorized to be appropriated for
each fiscal year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this part.
See also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 313 (1968).
127. 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973), revd., 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974).
128. 354 F. Supp. at 622.
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Moreover, granting AFDC benefits to pregnant mothers, and
thereby promoting prenatal care and nutrition, would contribute to
the maintenance of the family unit. Overwhelming evidence shows
that there is a severe problem of prenatal malnutrition in the United
States, especially among poor families.129 A woman's nutritional needs
rise dramatically during pregnancy, but the dietary supplements
available to the middle-class mother are virtually unknmvn to the
poor.1so
Malnutrition during pregnancy may have severe consequences
at all stages of a child's health and development. Before birth, inadequate nutrition increases the likelihood of complications of pregnancy such as anemia, toxemia, threatened and actual miscarriages,
premature births, and stillbirths.131 Children of mothers who had
deficient prepartum diets have a higher susceptibility to illness during infancy182 and are more likely to die within a year of birth than
children of mothers who had proper nourishment during pregnancy.1ss
The effects of prenatal malnutrition also extend to the child's later life, influencing his subsequent physical and psychological development.184 There is increasing medical evidence that a lack of protein
prior to birth can cause severe brain damage1 36 that usually cannot
be reversed by subsequent nutrition and medical care.136 In addition,
a strong correlation exists between mental retardation and prenatal
malnutrition.137
Inasmuch as adequate prenatal diets and medical care frequently
are financially unavailable to poor mothers,138 the receipt of AFDC
benefits may be crucial to the well-being of the child both before
and after birth. The health of a child is in turn important to the
family's cohesiveness, which suggests that the eligibility for AFDC
129. CITIZENS' BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION IN THE UNITED
STATES, HUNGER, U.S.A. 20 (1968) [hereinafter HUNGER, U.S.A.].
130. Id.
131. P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER & J. KAGAN, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALU'Y 81
(1969).
132. HUNGER, U.S.A., supra note 129, at 29; Weihofen, Poverty and Mental Health,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 920, 923 (1966).
133. Katz, Ignorance Aggravates U.S. Nutrition Policies, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 23,
1974, § C, at 16, col. 1.
134. HUNGER, U.S.A., supra note 129, at 30; J. MAYER, U.S. NUTRITION POLICIES IN
THE SEvENTIES 17 (1973); Nutrition Hearings, supra note 18, pt. 3, at 1085.
135. HUNGER, U.S.A., supra note 129, at 30; Katz, supra note 133; Nutrition Hearings, supra note 18, pt. 3, at 1085.
136. J. MAYER, supra note 134, at 20.
137. P. MUSSEN, J. CoNGER & J. KAGAN, supra note 131, at 81; HUNGER, U.S.A., supra
note 129, at 30. See generally R. HURLEY, supra note 14; Weihofen, supra note 132,
at 921-24.
UIS. HUNGER, U.S.A., supra note 129, at 29-30.
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benefits of the unborn child comes within the congressional policy as
announced in section 401 of the Social Security Act.180

Postscript:
After this article was sent to press, the Supreme Court decided
the case of Bums v. Alcala, 43 U.S.L.W. 4374 (U.S. March 18, 1975).
The Court held by a seven-to-one margin that states need not grant
AFDC benefits to unborn children, in effect following the HEW
regulation quoted in note 22 supra.
The first step in the Courts opinion, which was ·written by
Justice Powell, was to set forth the Court's approach to the statutory
construction of the AFDC provisions of the Social Security Act.
Justice Powell acknowledged that several lower courts that have examined the issue have interpreted King, Carleson, and Townsend to
establish the rule that "persons who are arguably included in the
federal eligibility standard must be deemed eligible unless the Act
or its legislative history clearly exhibits an intent to exclude them
from coverage, in effect creating a presumption of coverage when the
statute is ambiguous." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4376. The Court rejected this
rule, noting that it constituted a "departure from ordinary principles
of statutory interpretation." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4376. Rather, it declared that the three cases "establish only that once the federal
standard of eligibility is defined, a participating State may not deny
aid to persons who come within it in the absence of a clear indication that Congress meant the coverage to be optional." 43 U.S.L.W.
at 4376. After articulating this approach, the Court devoted the bulk
of its opinion to a futile examination of the Social Security Act and
its legislative history for evidence that Congress intended to include
unborn children in the class eligible for AFDC benefits.
Apparently, then, the first step courts must take in determining
the validity of substantive state limitations on AFDC eligibility is to
search for affirmative evidence that Congress intended to benefit the
plaintiff. Only when satisfied that the plaintiff is included under the
Act will the Court reach the ultimate issue of the validity of the
state limitation.
The Court based its approach on the King trilogy. However, only
two of the three cases fit comfortably within the Court's analysis. In
King, the "substitute father" case, there was evidence that Congress
intended to aid all children who did not have a parent with a legal
duty to support them. Since the evidence on inclusion was clear, the
Court struck dmvn the "substitute father" regulation with little
hesitation. Similarly, in Townsend there was legislative history that
indicated that students aged 18 to 21 were intended to be covered
by the Act, although that case ostensibly rested on the finding that
139. See note 126 supra.
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the exclusion was not clearly authorized. In Carleson, however, there
was absolutely no evidence in the Act or its legislative history that
Congress intended to benefit children with parents who were absent
due to military service. See text following note 64 supra. The Court
bypassed the initial question of inclusion, contrary to its approach
in Alcala, and went directly to the issue of whether Congress had
explicitly authorized states to exclude such children from eligibility.
Finding no such authorization, the Court struck down the state
limitation.
In most cases the difference between the "presumption of coverage" approach the Court arguably took in Carleson and the neutral
approach the Court took in Alcala will be of little significance. Usually the weight of the evidence will be either for or against inclusion.
Only in cases in which there is no evidence of legislative intent (or,
as in Alcala, in which the evidence gives rise to conflicting inferences)
would the "presumption" approach yield different results. But it is
in precisely such cases that there must be a presumption of some kind.
By refusing to presume for the plaintiff, the Court in Alcala in effect
presumed for the defendant. This choice may have been unfortunate.
AFDC is a remedial program designed to aid needy children and
their families. When issues of eligibility have arisen under other federal remedial legislation, such as Old Age Assistance, 42 U.S.C. §§
301-06 (1970), federal courts customarily have construed eligibility
criteria liberally and extended benefits to individuals who were not
clearly covered. See, e.g., H_aberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.
1969); Rasmussen v. Gardner, 374 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1967); Dieno
v. Celebrezze, 347 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1965); Leitz v. Flemming, 264
F.2d 311 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 820 (1959); Schwing v.
United States, 165 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1948). A similar pattern has
prevailed in state court construction of workmen's compensation
laws. See, e.g., Green v. Burch, 164 Kan. 348, 189 P.2d 892 (1948);
Boen v. Foster, 241 Miss. 520, 130 S.2d 877 (1961); Jones v. Loving,
363 P.2d 512 (Okla. 1961); Shubert v. Steelman, 214 Tenn. 102, 377
S.W.2d 940 (1964). Moreover, to hold that a group need not be given
aid because it does not fall within federal eligibility standards and
at the same time allow federal funds to be used by states that do
decide to aid that group-as the Court held in Alcala-may do
violence to the federal nature of the AFDC program. See text at note,s
84-85 supra.
The Court's holding with respect to the validity of a state'f.
refusal to grant aid to persons who are eligible under federal standards is more encouraging. The Court stated: "The State must provide benefits to all individuals who meet the federal definition of
'dependent child' and who are 'needy' under state standards, unless
they are excluded or aid is made optional by another provision of
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the Act." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4375. Surprisingly, the Court cited Dub lino
as well as the King trilogy in support of this statement. In Dublino,
it will be recalled, the Court upheld a state-imposed condition of
eligibility that was not expressly authorized under the Social Security Act. See text at notes 65-73 supra. By requiring "a clear indication that Congress meant the coverage to be optional," 43 U.S.L.W.
at 4376, the Court in Alcala infused new life into King, Carleson,
and Townsend and gave reason to hope that Dub lino would perhaps
be limited to state-imposed procedural requirements. See text at notes
71-87 supra. On the other hand, since the Court did not find that
unborn children fell within the federal standard, the validity of a
state refusal to grant aid to eligible individuals was not squarely
placed in issue, and the future application of Dublino remains uncertain.
The bulk of the Court's opinion was devoted to analyzing whether
unborn children fell within the Act's definition of "dependent
child." The Court correctly concluded that there was no explicit
legislative history or statutory language that indicated that the unborn were included. However, the Court rejected the claim that
the HEW regulation authorizing states to grant AFDC benefits to
unborn, needy children was evidence that such children came under
the Act. Instead, the Court accepted the HEW's argument that "unborn children are not included in the federal eligibility standard
and ... the regulation authorizing federal participation in AFDC
payments to pregnant women is based on the agency's general authority to make rules for efficient administration of the Act. 42
U.S.C. § 1302." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4377. The Court noted that the regulation appeared alongside "other rules authorizing temporary aid,
at the option of the States, to individuals in the process of gaining
or losing eligibility for the AFDC program." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4377.
The other rules authorizing temporary aid, however, were promulgated pursuant to and were in accord with section 406(e) of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970), which defines
"emergency assistance to needy families with children." Emergency
assistance is clearly stated to be within each state's option, but it
cannot be granted for more than 30 days. Assistance to pregnant
women on behalf of their unborn children may exceed 30 days under
the HEW regulation, as it is conditioned only on the determination
of pregnancy by medical diagnosis. The "unborn children" regulation thus stands alone in this area as an instance of the HEW's
rule-making power under 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). Seen in this light,
"the agency's assertion that it has never deemed unborn children to
be within the eligibility provisions of § 406(a)" must be viewed
"somewhat skeptically." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4379 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The more persuasive view is that the regulation, and the long
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administrative practice conducted pursuant to it, indicate that unborn children do come under the Acts definition of "dependent
child."

